We combine questions from the Michigan Survey about the future path of prices, interest rates, and unemployment to investigate whether U.S. households are aware of the so-called Taylor (1993) rule. For comparison, we perform the same analysis using questions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Our …ndings support the view that some households form their expectations about the future path of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment in a way that is consistent with Taylor-type rules. The extent to which this happens, however, does not appear to be uniform across income and education levels. In particular, we …nd evidence that the relationship between unemployment and interest rates is not properly understood by households in the lowest income quartile, and by those with no high school diploma. We also …nd evidence that the perceived e¤ect of unemployment on interest rates is asymmetric, being relevant only for interest-rate decreases. Finally, we argue that the relationships we uncover can be given a causal interpretation.
Introduction
"Improving the public's understanding of the central bank's policy strategy reduces economic and …nancial uncertainty and helps households and …rms make more-informed decisions. Moreover, clarity about goals and strategies can help anchor the public's longer-term in ‡ation expectations more …rmly and thereby bolsters the central bank's ability to respond forcefully to adverse shocks." (Bernanke, 2010a) .
Central bankers often emphasize the need to communicate with the public in order to improve its understanding of monetary policy. As the argument goes, this should allow for better-informed price-and wage-setting decisions on the part of households, and …rms and improve policy e¤ective-ness. More generally, agents'understanding of how policies that a¤ect their decisions are conducted is perceived to be a key ingredient in the transmission mechanism of such policies. This perception is likely guided by economic theories in which the behavior of the economy depends on the interaction between the actual conduct of policy and agents'understanding of it. This interaction is well articulated in the work of Eusepi and Preston (2010) , for example. In their model, if agents are not fully aware of the behavior of the central bank, policies that would otherwise guarantee stable in ‡ation expectations might leave the door open to expectations-driven ‡uctuations.
In this paper we take a step back from the literature on central bank communication, expectation formation, and monetary policy e¤ectiveness and investigate whether economic agents -households in particular -understand how monetary policy is conducted. Since the work of Taylor (1993) , it became standard practice to posit that the Fed conducts monetary policy in the U.S. according to an interest-rate ("Taylor") rule that speci…es a target for the policy rate as a function of deviations of in ‡ation from its objective and some measure of slack in economic activity, such as the output gap.
Estimating such policy reaction functions is the focus of a large empirical literature in monetary economics. 1 Overall, Taylor-type interest-rate rules are seen as a reasonable description of how policy has been conducted in the United States during most of the time since the late 1980s. 2 However, there is much less empirical work on the question of how agents perceive the conduct of monetary policy. Perhaps this is the case because these perceptions are not directly observed nor surveyed.
Our goal is to assess whether households are aware of what we refer to as the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule: that the policy interest rate tends to increase with in ‡ation and to decrease with slack in economic activity. Most of the time, these principles provide a qualitative description of how the Fed pursues its so-called dual mandate of price stability and full employment. To address this issue, we use the Survey of Consumers, conducted by Thompson Reuters and the University of Michigan ("Michigan Survey"), combining questions about the future path of prices, interest rates, and unemployment.
We adopt a simple empirical approach that, at an intuitive level, is based on the idea of separating survey answers about the paths of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment that are consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule from those that are not. To …x ideas, suppose that the Fed's target for the federal funds rate depends positively on contemporaneous in ‡ation and negatively on contemporaneous unemployment and changes only with these two variables. Then, to be consistent with how the Fed conducts monetary policy, survey answers that indicate unemployment will go down and in ‡ation will go up in one year would necessarily have to be accompanied by an answer that the Fed will tighten monetary policy in the same period.
Likewise, answers that in ‡ation will drop and unemployment will go up must be associated with a call that the Fed will ease policy.
More generally, however, an answer that is inconsistent with a particular version of the Taylor rule need not imply a misunderstanding of how monetary policy is conducted. The reason is that no speci…c interest-rate rule is a perfect description of policy. 3 To address this issue and provide answers to our research question that can be relied on more generally, we look for consistency in households' answers in a way that is less restrictive than the test illustrated in the previous paragraph. Speci…cally, we test whether various empirical frequencies of households' responses about the future paths of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment di¤er from each other in a way that is consistent with the principles underlying the Taylor rule. To give a concrete example of our empirical approach, given a response about future in ‡ation, we test if forecasts that interest rates will go up are more prevalent among households who predict unemployment will decline than among those who predict the opposite.
To help interpret our results for the Michigan Survey, we apply the same consistency tests using forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We take the view that professional forecasters are likely aware of how monetary policy is conducted in the United States and use results based on this survey as a reference against which to judge the …ndings based on the Michigan Survey.
The results we obtain are broadly consistent with the view that some U.S. households are aware of the principles underlying the conduct of monetary policy when forming their expectations about the future paths of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment. The degree of awareness, however, does not appear to be uniform across income and education levels, nor symmetric across predicted movements for interest rates. Our …ndings support the view that households are generally aware of how monetary policy tends to respond to changes in in ‡ation. When it comes to unemployment, however, we …nd that answers by households in the lowest income quartile and by households with no high school diploma do not reveal the expected relationship between changes in that variable and changes in interest rates. Finally, answers by households in the upper quartile of the income distribution and households with a college degree reveal a statistically signi…cant relationship only between increases in unemployment and decreases in interest rates.
Applying the same analysis to the SPF, we …nd the expected relationship between predicted changes in unemployment and predicted changes in interest rates. Surprisingly, however, we do not …nd statistically signi…cant evidence of the expected relationship between predicted changes in interest rates and predicted changes in in ‡ation. This result is troubling because in the Michigan Survey the expected relationship between interest rates and in ‡ation shows up even in the responses of low-income and no-high-school-diploma households. We then entertain the possibility that professional forecasters consider core in ‡ation (i.e., in ‡ation excluding volatile components such as food and energy) to be a more important factor than headline in ‡ation in shaping monetary policy decisions. Since 2007 the SPF includes forecasts of core in ‡ation in addition to headline in ‡ation. Despite the small number of observations that include forecasts of core in ‡ation (only one year of data in our sample), our analysis based on those observations provides statistical support for the view that professional forecasters' answers are consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule in both of its unemployment and (core) in ‡ation dimensions. 4 While we rely on a reduced-form empirical approach, we argue that the relationships we uncover between in ‡ation and unemployment on one side and interest rates on the other side can be given a causal interpretation. To that end, we …rst address the issue of endogeneity of in ‡ation and unemployment, which arises if exogenous changes in interest rates a¤ect these two variables. 5 We argue that a realistic degree of endogeneity of in ‡ation and unemployment should not be a problem for our analysis for two reasons. First, empirical evidence shows that exogenous changes in interest 4 At its January 2012 meeting, the FOMC stated that "... in ‡ation at the rate of 2 percent, as measured by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures, is most consistent over the longer run with the Federal Reserve's statutory mandate."However, in several earlier speeches, Fed o¢ cials highlighted core in ‡ation as being a useful measure for in ‡ation in the long run (e.g., Bernanke 2010 and Williams 2011). More importantly, Fed o¢ cials sometimes gave strong indications that core in ‡ation was the relevant concept underlying its mandate to pursue price stability. For example, Bernanke (2007) states that "... the current stance of policy is likely to foster sustainable economic growth and a gradual ebbing of core in ‡ation." 5 In the monetary economics literature, these exogenous movements are often referred to as monetary or policy shocks.
rates account for at most a modest fraction of the variance of in ‡ation and unemployment at the horizons of interest (e.g., Leeper, Sims, and Zha 1996) . Second, we are interested in making inferences about the signs of the causal e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment on interest rates. So, to the extent that the bias induced by endogeneity is commensurate with the fraction of the variance of in ‡ation and unemployment that is due to exogenous changes in interest rates, it should not a¤ect our inference. To substantiate our claim, we rely on the dynamic, stochastic, generalequilibrium model of Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2011) as a laboratory. We generate arti…cial data from that model, and apply our reduced-form empirical analysis to make inferences about the signs of the causal e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment on interest rates. When we use the parameters that those authors estimate using data for the U.S. economy, we …nd that our empirical approach recovers the correct signs of those causal e¤ects. Corroborating our argument, we also show that our approach to inference cannot be relied upon if interest-rate shocks are excessively volatile. But in that case they explain a counterfactually large fraction of the variance of in ‡ation and unemployment.
We then provide a simple model to illustrate how one may interpret our …ndings. The model allows for heterogeneity in agents'forecasts of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment, and in the way that they perceive the causal e¤ects of the latter two variables on the former. We use the model to understand what happens when we apply our empirical approach to a pool of answers to questions about interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment akin to those of the Michigan Survey in an environment with the aforementioned heterogeneity. We …nd that our approach recovers an average of households'perceptions of the e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment on interest rates.
Finally, we discuss an important assumption underlying our interpretation, namely that households' responses to the question about interest rates are conditional on the respondents' answers about the paths for in ‡ation and unemployment. Building on the insights of Charles Manski (e.g., Manski 2005), we illustrate and discuss how alternative assumptions might a¤ect the interpretation that we favor.
A few recent papers investigate whether professional economists'and …nancial market participants'forecasts of interest rates, in ‡ation, and output growth or some other measure of economic activity conform with Taylor-type interest-rate rules. Mitchell and Pearce (2009) rates, in ‡ation, and in the economic situation in the euro zone. They focus on the accuracy of interest-rate forecasts and on decomposing forecast errors into those for in ‡ation and economic activity and those due to misunderstanding of how the European Central Bank conducts monetary policy. These four papers are thus related to our analysis of the SPF. However, our empirical approach di¤ers from theirs, since it is tailored to our analysis of the Michigan Survey. Finally, Hamilton et al. (2011) use the e¤ects of macroeconomic news on fed funds futures contracts to estimate the market-perceived Taylor rule.
In Section 2 we start by describing the data we use in our analysis. Section 3 reports our results, contrasting the …ndings for the Michigan Survey with those for the SPF. This section also presents our analysis by demographic groups in the Michigan Survey. Section 4 addresses the issues of endogeneity and causality and presents a simple framework to interpret the results of our empirical approach. We also discuss assumptions that are important to justify the interpretations of our results. The last section concludes. The Appendix reports a series of additional results that con…rm the robustness of our …ndings.
Data and empirical approach 2.1 Michigan Survey
Each month the Michigan Survey conducts telephone interviews with approximately 500 households and asks roughly 50 questions. The questionnaire covers personal …nances, demographics, business conditions, and, key to this paper, it also inquires about household expectations about main economic variables, such as interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment. The sample choice is statistically designed to represent all American households, and survey weights are provided to allow for inference on the population. 6 Each month, an independent cross-section sample of households is selected, and some respondents are re-interviewed six months later. Under this rotating sample method, at each survey around 40% of households are being interviewed for the second time and 60% are new respondents. 7 The monthly survey data begin in January 1978. Besides the inclusion of new questions, no substantial changes have been made to the pre-existing questionnaire since that time.
Our interest-rate variable corresponds to the answer to the following survey question:
"No one can say for sure, but what do you think will happen to interest rates for borrowing money during the next 12 months -will they go up, stay the same, or go down? " For unemployment, we consider the answer to the question: "How about people out of work during the coming 12 months -do you think that there will be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less? " Households are not asked directly about in ‡ation but instead about the direction of price movements and its expected size. In particular, they answer the following two questions: In order to use the available questions for our study, we make the following assumptions. To deal with the fact that the question about interest rates pertains to "interest rates for borrowing money", and does not specify the measure it refers to, we simply assume that the answers to an analogous question about the policy interest rate would be the same. This is a good assumption as long as the spread between the borrowing rates that the household has in mind when answering the survey question and the policy rate does not vary too much. In our robustness analysis, presented in the Appendix, we verify that our …ndings are essentially unchanged if we restrict our sample to periods in which borrowing rates and the policy rate move in the same direction. Regarding the question about unemployment, we assume that the answers to an analogous question about the direction of the unemployment gap -the di¤erence between the unemployment rate and the level of unemployment that corresponds to full employment -would be the same. This is a good assumption as long as the actual unemployment rate varies su¢ ciently more than the unemployment rate consistent with full employment. In our robustness analysis we use the Congressional Budget O¢ ce's estimate of the non-accelerating-in ‡ation rate of unemployment to construct a measure of the unemployment gap. Our substantive …ndings are unchanged if we restrict our sample to periods in which unemployment and that measure of the unemployment gap move in the same direction.
The question related to the path of prices is slightly trickier. First, it does not specify a price measure. We assume it refers to the level of the headline Consumer Price Index. Second, it refers to the path for the general level of prices in the next 12 months, and not to expected changes in 12-month in ‡ation. We thus construct arti…cial responses to a question about the direction of 12-month in ‡ation by subtracting the CPI in ‡ation in the 12 months leading up to the month of the survey from each individual response. 8 Analogously with the question about unemployment, we assume that the direction of change of actual in ‡ation maps one-to-one into the direction of change of the di¤erence of in ‡ation from the Fed's target. This is a sensible assumption given the Fed's mandate to pursue price stability.
Thus, conditional on our assumptions, we have answers to questions about the sign of expected 12-month changes in interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment. The Michigan Survey also provides demographic characteristics about respondents. This allows us to redo our analysis conditional on speci…c characteristics. In particular, we will focus on levels of income, education and age. 
Survey of Professional Forecasters
The SPF is conducted at a quarterly frequency and dates from the last quarter of 1968, when it was implemented by the American Statistical Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research. Since the second quarter of 1992, the SPF has been conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The sample size varies from year to year, with the Survey interviewing an average of 138 forecasters per year. At each quarter, respondents receive the questionnaire, which 8 We convert the resulting numbers into an answer about the direction of CPI in ‡ation by assigning a value of one when a household's 12-month in ‡ation forecast exceeds in ‡ation in the 12 months up to and including the month of the survey, zero if these two numbers coincide, and -1 otherwise. We convert the categorical answers about interest rates and unemployment in the same way.
has to be …lled and returned within a pre-established deadline. The survey covers expectations about several in ‡ation, economic activity, unemployment, and interest-rate measures. Respondents are also required to provide their quarterly and yearly forecasts for time frames that vary from one year to three years ahead.
Unlike the Michigan Survey, the SPF asks agents about their expectations for future levels of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment. In particular, respondents are asked to provide their forecast for the next four quarters for well-speci…ed measures of each of the three variables of interest. We focus on forecasts for the 3-month Treasury bill rate, CPI in ‡ation, and the urban civilian unemployment rate. To make our results based on the SPF comparable to the Michigan Survey, we build categorical variables indicating whether the respondents expect the variable to move up or down or stay the same. For CPI in ‡ation, we average across agents' forecasts for the next four quarters and subtract realized in ‡ation in the four quarters up to and including the quarter of the survey.
Empirical approach
As a …rst step in our analysis we perform a simple test for the presence of a statistical relationship between interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment. Speci…cally, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of two distributions to test whether the empirical frequencies of responses about the direction of interest rates conditional on the responses about the direction of in ‡ation and unemployment di¤er statistically from the unconditional frequencies. We then test if whatever relationship between expected movements of interest rates and expected movements of in ‡ation and unemployment exists in the data is consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule.
To ease the exposition of what we actually test for, we introduce some notation. For a given pool of answers about the direction of change of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment in the subsequent 12 months, let P (x ") denote the fraction of answers that indicate that variable x will increase. We refer to P (x) as the empirical frequency of predictions for 12-month changes in
x. Likewise, we use P (x # j y "; z $) to denote the fraction of answers that indicate that x will decrease in the next 12 months in the pool of answers that indicate that y will increase and z will remain unchanged over the same period.
With this notation, we de…ne the partial e¤ ects of in ‡ation and unemployment associated with what we refer to as the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule:
The di¤erences in (1) and (2) are the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation. For example, for any given forecasted change in unemployment u ("; #; or $), going from a pool of households that predict stable in ‡ation to a pool that predicts increasing in ‡ation should increase the incidence of answers saying that interest rates will go up, and decrease the incidence of forecasts that interest rates will trend down. Likewise, inequalities in (3) and (4) de…ne the partial e¤ects of unemployment.
For each of the partial e¤ects de…ned in equations (1) through (4), we set up a one-sided test where the null hypothesis is the inequality that violates the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule (i.e., that contradicts those partial e¤ects). Rejection of a null hypothesis thus amounts to evidence that the particular partial e¤ect being tested conforms with those stabilization principles. 9 3 Results
Realized data
We start by illustrating our empirical approach using the actual monthly data on the 3-month Treasury bill rate, 12-month CPI in ‡ation, and the unemployment rate for the sample period de…ned in Subsection 2.1. We note one caveat at the outset, that some of the conditional frequencies that we need to estimate are based on a small number of observations and some are even degenerate.
Still, we choose to illustrate our empirical approach subject to these limitations, as this serves the additional purpose of providing evidence that the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule are discernible in the data when we apply our approach.
The top half of Table 1 documents the (unconditional) frequency of upward and downward movements in each of the three variables, whereas the bottom half of the table reports the frequency of the direction of interest-rate changes conditional on combinations of movements in in‡ation and unemployment. 10 In line with the notation de…ned in Subsection 2.3, we use P (x) and 9 An alternative would be to estimate ordered probit models. In the Appendix we brie ‡y discuss the pros and cons of each approach and present estimates based on ordered probits.
1 0 Episodes that involve 12-month in ‡ation remaining constant do not appear because this is never observed in our sample.
P (xj y "; z #; w $) to denote, respectively, the unconditional empirical frequencies of the direction of 12-month changes in variable x, and the conditional empirical frequencies of the direction of 12-month changes in variable x given that y increases, z decreases, and w remains unchanged over the same period. Note that the number of observations in the conditional frequencies P (ij "; u $) and P (ij #; u $) is extremely small. In what follows, we drop these two distributions and perform our tests only for partial e¤ects that involve changes in unemployment. Equations (5) and (6) de…ne the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and equations (7) and (8) de…ne the partial e¤ects unemployment after that exclusion: 
Conditional frequencies
22.78 -77.22 79 P (i j "; u $) 100.00 -0.00 3 P (i j "; u ") 100.00 -0.00 46
43.48 -56.52 69 P (i j #; u $) 80.00 -20.00 5 P (i j #; u ") 100.00 -0.00 43 Table 1 presents conditional and unconditional frequencies in the data. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests based on these frequencies suggest that, unsurprisingly, changes in interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment are statistically related. 11 Table 2 reports one-sided tests of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment. 12 Note that we use overlapping 12-month periods, and thus we compute standard errors and test statistics that account for serial correlation using the Newey-West approach. In the absence of an obvious guide to pick the correlation lag length, we obtain standard errors with correction for autocorrelation ranging from 1 to 12 months. For consistency, throughout the paper we report standard errors that account for residuals correlation of up to 12 lags. 13 All of the partial e¤ects are statistically signi…cant and in line with the principles underlying the Taylor rule. 
Partial e¤ects of unemployment Null Hypothesis mean di¤ t-stat p-value
0.57 3.24 0.00
0.77 5.37 0.00 Table 3 reports the unconditional and conditional frequencies of households'responses regarding the expected changes in interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment, in analogy to Table 1 . A striking di¤erence relative to the empirical distributions based on the realized data is the unconditional frequency of responses about the direction of changes in unemployment. While households got it roughly right that unemployment would increase slightly more than one-third of the time during our sample, more than half of their responses indicated that unemployment would be unchanged after 12 months -whereas in reality this only happened around 3% of the time. The discrepancy in the distribution of answers about changes in interest rates is smaller but also noteworthy. Answers about in ‡ation fare better in this comparison. 14 The bottom half of Table 3 reports the conditional frequencies of movements in interest rates based on households' responses. They also appear to be quite di¤erent from the corresponding empirical distributions based on realized data. These di¤erences may re ‡ect poor forecasting per-formance and/or poor understanding of the relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment on one side and interest rates on the other side. In what follows we focus on whether we can use these answers to tease out information about how households perceive that relationship using the partial e¤ects de…ned in the previous section. This question is of interest irrespective of whether households are good forecasters. Table 4 reports one-sided tests of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment perceived by households, given in equations (1) through (4). All of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation are statistically signi…cant, and in line with the principles underlying the Taylor rule. The same is not true of the partial e¤ects of unemployment. In fact, only two out of the eight partial e¤ects that we test for are consistent with the principles underlying the Taylor rule, and some of the tests actually provide statistically signi…cant evidence in favor of partial e¤ects with the opposite sign.
Michigan Survey
However, results for the partial e¤ects of unemployment might be driven by distributions of responses that involve predictions of stable unemployment (u $). Indeed, all of the partial e¤ects rely on such distributions. To check whether they drive the results for the partial e¤ects of unemployment, we redo the tests based on partial e¤ects that only involve distributions derived from answers that unemployment will move up or down, as described by equations (5) through (8).
The results of the one-sided tests are presented in Table 5 (for completeness we also redo the tests for the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation). They show that the statistically signi…cant evidence against the perceived partial e¤ects of unemployment being consistent with the Taylor rule does not hinge on the pools of answers that involve forecasts of stable unemployment.
We conclude that households'perceived partial e¤ects of in ‡ation are consistent with the principles underlying the Taylor rule in all cases. For unemployment, however, this is not the case. There is statistical evidence that some of the partial e¤ects of unemployment are consistent with those principles -those that pertain to interest-rate decreases. But there is also evidence that some of the perceived partial e¤ects of unemployment are opposite to what the principles underlying the 
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-0.01 -2.06 0.98 Taylor rule imply. These results might suggest that households do not perceive the relationship between unemployment and interest rates symmetrically, failing to realize the e¤ects that tightening labor market conditions appear to have on the likelihood of interest-rate increases. We explore this possibility further in the next subsection, where we redo our analysis pooling answers according to households'demographic characteristics.
Demographics
We …rst focus on income and education levels, and then provide results by age groups. We start by comparing results for the lowest and highest income quartiles, and for the groups of respondents with no high school diploma, and those who have at least a college degree. For brevity we present the conditional and unconditional frequencies of responses in the Appendix, and exclude results that involve forecasts of stable unemployment (results are robust to using those answers as well). The …rst part of Table 6 shows the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation by, respectively, income and education levels. With few exceptions, they are statistically signi…cant at the usual levels and in accordance with the principles underlying the Taylor rule. The same is not true of the partial e¤ects of unemployment. The second part of Table 6 shows that for low-income households there is only one statistically signi…cant partial e¤ect with the expected sign. In fact, two of the partial e¤ects of unemployment for this demographic group show up as statistically signi…cant with a sign that contradicts the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule. In contrast, all but one of the partial e¤ects of unemployment come out as expected for households in the highest income quartile. Turning to education, for households without a high school diploma only one partial e¤ect of unemployment is statistically signi…cant with the expected sign. In contrast, both partial e¤ects of unemployment for interest-rate decreases come out as expected for households with at least a college degree.
Among the several additional demographic characteristics that the Michigan Survey provides, we report in Table 7 the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment across age intervals of the head of the household. Heads with a higher age pro…le have experienced di¤erent economic environments and are more likely to have learned about monetary policy over time. Indeed, the table shows that the highest age bracket is the only one for which all of the partial e¤ects of unemployment come out consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule.
Survey of professional forecasters
We now turn to the SPF. The top half of Table 8 reports the unconditional frequencies of professional forecasters'responses regarding the direction of 12-month changes in interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment, while the bottom half of the table reports the conditional frequencies of answers regarding interest-rate changes. In line with the realized data, note the small number of observations for distributions that involve forecasts of stable unemployment. In what follows we exclude results that involve these forecasts. Table 9 reports one-sided tests of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment perceived 
0.12 5.63 0.00 0.11 3.51 0.00
0.10 7.58 0.00 0.11 5.68 0.00
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0.06 5.01 0.00 0.08 7.05 0.00 by professional forecasters. Perhaps surprisingly, none of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation implied by the Taylor rule are statistically signi…cant at the usual signi…cance levels. In contrast, the partial e¤ects of unemployment are statistically signi…cant, in line with the Taylor rule, and quite large when compared to the partial e¤ects of unemployment based on the Michigan Survey. 
0.03 0.91 0.18 P (i " j #; u ") P (i " j "; u ") 0.08 2.46 0.01
Partial e¤ects of unemployment Null Hypothesis mean di¤ t-stat p-value P (i " j #; u ") P (i " j #; u #) 0.34 10.30 0.00 P (i " j "; u ") P (i " j "; u #) 0.29 9.69 0.00 The results on the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment may suggest that professional forecasters perceive the relationship between interest-rate decisions, in ‡ation, and unemployment to be tilted towards the employment dimension. Alternatively, they may imply a perception that headline in ‡ation is not the most important metric for the FOMC's gauge of price stability. As an attempt to test the latter conjecture, we redo our analysis of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation perceived by professional forecasters using their forecasts for core CPI (excluding food and energy) instead of headline CPI in ‡ation. We note the caveat that the SPF only started asking participants about their forecasts for core CPI in 2007, so our sample is limited to a single year. Despite this data limitation, Table 10 shows that once the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation are cast in terms of core rather than headline CPI, they become larger, and some of them become statistically signi…cant. This suggests that professional forecasters indeed have a more nuanced view of how monetary policy responds to in ‡ation. 15 
Interpreting our results

Endogeneity and causality
An issue that we haven't discussed to this point is how to think about endogeneity and causality given our empirical approach. If none of the variation in in ‡ation and unemployment comes from Table 10 : Partial e¤ects of core in ‡ation -SPF Null Hypothesis mean di¤ t-stat p-value P (i " j #; u #) P (i " j "; u #) 0.32 2.19 0.01 P (i " j #; u ") P (i " j "; u ") 0.24 2.60 0.00 departures from the Fed's systematic interest-rate policy ("monetary policy shocks"), then endogeneity is not a problem. If this is not the case, and such monetary shocks a¤ect the endogenous determination of in ‡ation and output, then there is a clear problem of endogeneity, and our empirical approach need not recover the true causal relationship between in ‡ation and unemployment on one side and interest rates on the other side. So, how do we explore about this issue given that, in reality, there is evidence that interest-rate shocks do a¤ect in ‡ation and economic activity? Our view is that, given our empirical approach, this is not likely to be a quantitatively important issue. The reasons are twofold. First, most evidence about the e¤ects of monetary (interest-rate) shocks suggests that they only explain a small to moderate fraction of the variance of in ‡ation and unemployment (e.g., Leeper, Sims, and Zha 1996). Second, while any extent of endogeneity bias immediately creates a problem for OLS-based inference about the magnitude of the parameters of the monetary policy rule that control the causal e¤ects of interest, this may still not matter for our conclusions. The reason is that our analysis is based on the signs of the e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment on interest rates -not on the magnitude of these e¤ects. Hence, to the extent that the endogeneity bias a¤ects the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cients in the reduced-form relationship of interest between interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment but does not a¤ect their sign, it does not matter for our conclusions.
To test our conjecture, we simulate a new Keynesian DSGE economy and apply our empirical approach to model-generated data. We use the Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2011) estimated DSGE model of the U.S. economy, which includes unemployment. 16 In their estimated model, shocks to the monetary policy rule explain about 7.6% of the variance of in ‡ation and 6.5% of the variance of unemployment. We obtain arti…cial time series for the policy rate, in ‡ation, and unemployment. For each simulated series, we build categorical variables corresponding to the direction of 12-month changes of each of the three variables, just as we do with realized data. We then apply our empirical approach to draw inferences about the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment.
The Taylor rule in the Galí-Smets-Wouters model includes an interest-rate smoothing component, as well as current in ‡ation and unemployment and the change in unemployment. In addition to their model, we estimate a variant with an alternative, simpler Taylor rule whereby interest rates only respond to current unemployment and 4-quarter in ‡ation. 17 In this alternative esti-mated model, shocks to the monetary policy rule explain about 5.1% of the variance of in ‡ation and 4.5% of the variance of unemployment.
We also consider variants of the two estimated models, obtained by increasing the variance of the monetary policy shock relative to the estimated values, while keeping all other estimated parameter values unchanged. With this comparison we want to assess the e¤ects of increasing the degree of endogeneity of in ‡ation and unemployment with respect to policy shocks. Under those two alternative speci…cations for the Taylor rule, and alternative assumptions for the relative importance of exogenous movements in interest rates, we use the simulated data to calculate the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment. 
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0.17 27.66 0.00 -0.16 -22.46 1.00 Table 11 presents the results. Panels labeled with "GSW"provide the results for the simulated model using the original Galí-Smets-Wouters speci…cation for the Taylor rule, while panels labeled with "Simple TR"provide the results from the model with the alternative Taylor rule. We present results using the estimated parameter values -indicated by the label "baseline"-and results with more volatile monetary policy shocks -indicated by the label "volatile shocks". For the latter we increase the estimated variance of monetary policy shocks by a factor of ten.
Con…rming our intuition, we …nd that the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment obtained from data generated by the estimated models come out with the expected signs, and are statistically signi…cant irrespective of the Taylor rule speci…cation. We also con…rm the intuition that our approach to inference might become invalid if monetary policy shocks are more volatile. In particular, with policy shocks that are ten times more volatile, the partial e¤ects of unemployment come out with the wrong sign. This re ‡ects reverse causality running from interest rates to unemployment. With large policy shocks, exogenous movements in interest rates explain a relatively large fraction of the variance of unemployment. An exogenous increase in interest rates induces a decline in unemployment in equilibrium, and this is what produces the inverse sign in the partial e¤ects of unemployment. 18 However, with more volatile policy shocks, the fraction of the variance of in ‡ation and unemployment that they account for becomes counterfactually largeabove 30% for the model with the simple Taylor rule, and above 40% for the Galí-Smets-Wouters model. We …nd that our approach to inference works well with monetary shocks that are up to four times more volatile than what the estimated models imply. Beyond that point the partial e¤ects of unemployment start to come out with the wrong sign. 19 
Heterogeneity and di¤erences of opinion
In this section we present a simple framework to interpret our empirical approach. The goal is to have a setting in which we can think formally about how to interpret the partial e¤ects and the statistical tests performed in Section 3.
Our starting point is a population of households, some of which reason according to a simple form of the Taylor rule. We assume that a such household has in mind a simple Taylor rule with two additive components. The …rst is a "systematic" component that satis…es the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule and which dictates how, on average, the household's interestrate forecast for a given date T should be related to the same household's forecasts of in ‡ation and unemployment for the same date. We denote this systematic interest-rate forecast by i t;T , and assume that it only depends on the household's forecasts of unemployment for date T (denoted u t;T ) and of in ‡ation in the 12-month period ending at date T (denoted t;T ), according to a simple Taylor-type rule: 20 i t;T = t;T + u u t;T :
The second component of the household's interest-rate forecast for date T is the amount by which the household believes the interest rate will deviate from the systematic forecast i j t;T . We introduce this forecast shock component (denoted " t;T ) because equation (9) is an imperfect description of 1 8 The same does not occur with in ‡ation. We conjecture that this has to do with the Taylor principle -the fact that the elasticity of the endogenous response of interest rates to in ‡ation is greater than unity. 1 9 The fraction of the variance of in ‡ation and unemployment accounted for by monetary policy shocks is also counterfactually large at this threshold level for the variance of monetary shocks: above 16% in the model with the simple Taylor rule, and above 20% in the Galí-Smets-Wouters model.
2 0 For simplicity we abstract from variations in the unemployment rate consistent with full employment and in the Fed's in ‡ation objective.
how the Fed sets its policy rate, and so we want to allow a household that understands the conduct of monetary policy to make interest-rate forecasts that deviate from its systematic component. We think of " t;T as being drawn by the household when forming its interest-rate forecast, from a distribution with cumulative distribution function F " ("), and assume that " t;T is independent of t;T , u t;T and of i t;t , t;t , u t;t -this assumption rules out endogeneity problems, and is justi…ed on the basis of the results of the previous subsection. Our previous assumption that i t;T is the forecast that the household makes on average implies that " t;T has mean zero.
The variables i t;t , t;t , and u t;t denote, respectively, the household's perceptions of the policy rate at time t, of in ‡ation in the 12 months up to and including time t, and of the unemployment rate at time t, which we assume to coincide with the actual values of these three variables (i.e., we assume that they are known to the households when they answer the survey questions at time t). Because we assume i t;t , t;t , and u t;t to be known at time t, the realization of " t;t also becomes known at time t.
The actual numerical interest-rate forecast of the household is denoted by i t;T = i t;T " t;T :
We do not specify how the household forms in ‡ation and unemployment forecasts and only assume that they are based on some model that produces a joint distribution of these two forecasts for any given horizon. 21 Recall that with the exception of in ‡ation, the questions in the Michigan Survey that we use in our analysis pertain to the direction of interest rates and unemployment in the subsequent 12 months. So, to move closer to the analysis that we perform with available data, we need to go from (10) to a speci…cation in changes instead of levels. To that end, we subtract (10) with T = t from (10) itself to arrive at: i t;T = t;T + u u t;T " t;T + " t;t ;
where x t;T = x t;T x t;t for x = i; ; u. With what we have developed so far, we can ask hypothetical questions such as the following: given numerical forecasts of in ‡ation and unemployment that imply a change in 12-month in ‡ation of and a change in unemployment of u twelve months from now, what is the probability that the household will answer that interest rates will go up in the next 12 months? Equation (11) implies that: i t;T 0 () " t;T t;T + u u t;T + " t;t :
Thus the answer to the hypothetical question would be:
Pr ( i t;T 0 j t ) = Pr (" t;T t;T + u u t;T + " t;t ) = F " ( t;T + u u t;T + " t;t ) ; where t = f t;T ; u t;T ; i t;t ; t;t ; u t;t ; ; u g, and to avoid cluttering the notation we omit the conditioning variables in the expressions in the right-hand-side of the expressions above. We can also ask simple questions of comparative statics, such as how that probability changes with the household's in ‡ation and unemployment forecasts:
@F " ( t;T + u u t;T + " t;t ) @ u t;T = F 0 " ( t;T + u u t;T + " t;t ) u 7 0;
where the signs of the expressions (12) and (13) depend on the signs of and u , and thus re ‡ect the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule if > 0 and u < 0. The results obtained so far would be useful if we could observe numerical forecasts of households over time. However, in the data we analyze we do not observe the same household more than once, 22 and we only have numerical forecasts for in ‡ation. Our next step is to construct an environment in which we can make comparative statics statements analogous to (12) and (13) based on one-time answers by a pool households.
Assume that we observe answers from a population of households such as the one we have been modeling so far in this subsection, and that there is heterogeneity in their forecasts of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment, and in their perceptions about the policy parameters and u . As a …rst step, assume that in ‡ation and unemployment forecasts are numerical, but interest-rate forecasts are categorical as in our data (up/down/same).
In the context of our simple framework, one way to model an individual household j's categorical response for the direction of interest rates is to assume that the answer is conditional on the forecast shock " Under the additional assumption that the forecast shocks " j t;T are independent across households, we can do comparative statics exercises analogous to (12) and (13) by pooling households according to their forecasts of in ‡ation and unemployment. 23 As an intermediate step, if we select a large pool of households with the same Taylor rule coe¢ cients ; u , and the same given forecasts for changes in in ‡ation and unemployment and u, by the law of large numbers the fraction of households answering that interest rates will move 2 2 As mentioned in Subsection 2.1, the Michigan Survey does have a small panel dimension, since a fraction of households are interviewed a second time. Nevertheless, having at most two observations for some households would not be enough do the empirical counterpart of the comparative static analysis implied by (12) and (13), household by household. 2 3 We also extend the assumption of independence between forecast shocks " up will be given by: 24
where J collects the indices of households in the pool that forecasts ( ; u) and perceives Taylor rule coe¢ cients ( ; u ). The numerator in equation (14) counts households in that pool who respond that interest rates will increase, and the denominator accounts for all possible responses about future interest rates (i.e., the size of the pool of households in J). " ; u represents the perceived policy shock realized at time t as a function of ; u . 25 To obtain the fraction of households that respond that interest rates will increase for given forecasts and u, we need to integrate over the distribution of policy coe¢ cients = ( ; u ), which we denote by F ( ; u ): 26
If we select another large pool of households with the same forecasted change in unemployment u, but with a higher forecast for the change in in ‡ation ( + ), the di¤erence between the two pools in the fraction of households answering that interest rates will go up will be given by:
We refer to quantities such as (15) as the -partial e¤ ects of in ‡ation. Dividing (15) by and taking the limit as ! 0 yields the comparative statics result analogous to (12), i.e.:
Likewise, we can compute the u -partial e¤ ects of unemployment by appropriate choice of two pools of households that share the same forecast for the change in in ‡ation, but di¤er in the forecast for the change in unemployment (by u ). The di¤erence between the fractions of households 2 4 To avoid cluttering the notation, from now on we drop the time subscripts. 2 5 This depends on the Taylor rule coe¢ cients because it is assumed to be inferred from the observation of the realized values for the interest rate, in ‡ation, and unemployment. 2 6 We assume that is distributed independently of all other variables in the population of households.
answering that interest rates will go up in the two pools will be given by:
The comparative statics result analogous to that in equation (13) can be obtained as before, dividing equation (17) by u and taking the limit as u ! 0. Hence, we can write the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment as:
Under the special case where " has a uniform distribution, F 0 " is a constant and the partial e¤ects above are proportional to the average values of and u in the population. More generally, the partial e¤ects uncover weighted averages of the Taylor rule coe¢ cients in the population of respondents. This result motivates the way we interpret our estimated partial e¤ects, as being informative of the perceptions that some households have about monetary policy.
Finally, note that we have assumed that the forecasts for in ‡ation and unemployment are numerical, whereas in our baseline results we use categorical answers for the questions about the future path of these two variables. Conditioning on the direction of the forecasted change instead of on the numerical forecasts can make a di¤erence for some of the results derived in the model. For instance, it may cause answers that were otherwise well de…ned to depend on the distribution of Taylor rule coe¢ cients perceived by households in the pool of respondents.
Since we only have categorical responses regarding the future path of unemployment, our empirical approach for estimating the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation can only be imperfectly justi…ed on the basis of the framework developed in this section. We could try to condition on households' answers to other questions in the Michigan Survey, in the hope that doing so would make it more likely that the selected pool of respondents had in mind the same (unobserved) forecasted change in unemployment when answering the survey question. However, we would still have to live with the possibility that unobserved heterogeneity in those numerical forecasts would cause problems.
Fortunately, as described in Subsection 2.1, the Michigan Survey does ask households about their numerical forecasts for in ‡ation. In the Appendix we present robustness results for the partial e¤ects of unemployment using those numerical in ‡ation forecasts -instead of only the direction for the change in in ‡ation. In particular, we test for the partial e¤ects of unemployment by deciles of in ‡ation forecasts. The results show that the substantive conclusions that can be drawn in this case are the same that can be drawn from our analysis in Section 3.
An important identifying assumption
Our simple framework helps us think about how a household that reasons in accordance with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule might answer categorical questions about interest rates, such as the one in the Michigan Survey. It also shows how, within the framework, those principles can be recovered from answers by a pool of such households that di¤er in their forecasts of in ‡ation and unemployment, and also possibly in their perceived Taylor rule coe¢ cients.
It is natural to ask whether the lessons we can draw from our analysis are robust to alternative assumptions, even strictly within our simple framework. An important identifying assumption that we make is that households' answers about the direction of interest rates are indeed conditional on their responses about in ‡ation and unemployment (which we assume come from an unspeci…ed model that produces a joint forecast for the path of these two variables). If that is not the case and households do not answer conditionally, one can build examples where a respondent thinks in accordance with the Taylor rule but answers in a way that does not re ‡ect so. 27 For example, consider a household that forms its interest-rate expectations according to the Taylor rule but answers the survey questionnaire by providing the modal forecast from the marginal distributions of the three variables. For simplicity, assume that the joint probability distributions for in ‡ation and unemployment are such that:
Since the household reasons according to the Taylor rule, this implies that P (i ") = P (i #) = 0:5. If the household answers the survey questions by …rst making a joint forecast for in ‡ation and unemployment, and then computing the implied interest-rate movement (conditional on that forecast), then P (i " j "; u #) = 1 and P (i # j #; u ") = 1, which is consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule. Likewise, if the household's answers correspond to a point in the joint distribution of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment, then if interestrate expectations accord with the Taylor rule the answers will reveal so. In contrast, if the household answers the questionnaire using the unconditional (marginal) distributions for the three variables separately, the resulting answers could be "; u # and i #, which would clearly violate the Taylor rule.
The above example illustrates a more general problem that arises when making inference based on survey data. It has to do precisely with the interpretation of what the responses pertain to. For example, Manski (2005) and Manski and Tamer (2002) raise issues related to those that we face here, in the context of empirical analyses that rely on categorical and interval survey data. Hence, the assumption that households' answers about interest rates are conditional on their answers about in ‡ation and unemployment can be seen as an identifying assumption without which we could not proceed. In future research, it would be interesting to test this assumption by explicitly asking households about their interest-rate forecasts conditional on their forecasts for in ‡ation and unemployment.
Conclusion
We combine questions from the Michigan Survey about the future path of prices, interest rates, and unemployment to investigate whether U.S. households are aware of how monetary policy is conducted in the United States. For comparison, we perform the same analysis using questions from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
Our …ndings are broadly consistent with the view that some U.S. households are aware of how the Fed conducts monetary policy when forming their expectations about the future paths of interest rates, in ‡ation, and unemployment. The degree of awareness, however, does not appear to be uniform across income and education levels, and age groups. Higher income, more educated, and older households appear to be more aware of the Taylor rule than younger, less educated, and lower income households. In addition, even among the former group of households, people seem to understand the relation between unemployment and interest rates only when it comes to interest rate decreases.
Given the importance that policymakers attach to communicating policy objectives to the public as a way to enhance its e¤ectiveness, we believe that more research should be directed at the more basic question of whether economic agents make sense of the conduct of policy. Our results suggest that there is scope for improving the public's understanding of even some basic dimensions of monetary policy in the United States. E¤orts in this direction may improve the e¤ects of the Fed's communication strategy. As mentioned previously, the question about interest rates in the Michigan Survey pertains to households'expectations about future borrowing rates. In our benchmark results we assume that the same answers would apply to expectations about the direction of policy rates. Here we redo our analysis of the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment restricting the sample to 12-month periods in which borrowing rates and the policy rate moved in the same direction. We consider the 3-month Treasury bill rate as the policy rate, which is the measure that features in the question of the SPF that we use in our analysis. 28 As a proxy for borrowing rates, we consider the Freddie Mac national mortgage rate. 29 Results based on this restricted sample are essentially unchanged. This is the case for both the analysis that pools all household answers - Table 12 -and for the …ndings based on answers by demographic groups - Table 13 . 
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In ‡ation deciles
For questions referring to unemployment and interest rates, the Michigan Survey only asks about the direction of change. However, it asks about household in ‡ation expectations. We can thus reestimate the partial e¤ects of unemployment while holding …xed the expected change in in ‡ation.
To that end, we divide the expected change in in ‡ation into ten deciles, and estimate the partial 
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0.10 8.67 0.00 0.10 9.36 0.00 e¤ects of unemployment for each decile. While the results vary across deciles, as a general statement they con…rm our baseline results (see Table 14 ). When conditioning on demographics, we …nd once again that answers by households that have at least a college degree and households at the highest income quartile are more in line with the relationship between unemployment and interest rates implied by the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule than answers by households with no high school diploma and by households at the lowest income quartile. For brevity we do not include the corresponding tables, which are available upon request. We did a series of additional robustness analyses. We split our sample between recession and nonrecession periods, 31 and did separate estimations for each subsample. Households'answers are more in line with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule during non-recession years. An important caveat is that the number of observations for non-recession periods is much higher than for recession periods, so this can be a driver of the results. Nevertheless, for both non-recession and recession periods, answers by households with a college degree and those in the highest income quartile appear to be more in line with the principles underlying the Taylor rule than answers by households with no high school diploma and by those in the lowest income quartile.
We also looked at the partial e¤ects of in ‡ation and unemployment by country regions, and recon…rmed most of our …ndings. A noteworthy result is that, when it comes to partial e¤ects of unemployment, answers by households in the Northeast are more consistent with the principles underlying the Taylor than answers by households elsewhere in the country.
Throughout the paper we report test statistics and p-values obtained through Newey West corretion for up to 12 lags. We redid all results with windows varying from 1 lag to 12 lags, and our substantive …ndings are unchanged. In addition, as a way to avoid potential problems generated by the 12-month rolling windows, we redid our analysis using only answers for the same month in each year (from January to December). Our results are again qualitatively unchanged. Interestingly, answers from the January surveys appear to be consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule for all partial e¤ects of unemployment. This does not happen with surveys carried out on any other month.
As mentioned in Subsection 2.1, we also redid our analysis using only periods in which unemployment and the unemployment gap -measured as the di¤erence between actual unemployment and the Congressional Budget O¢ ce's estimate of the non-accelerating-in ‡ation rate of unemployment -moved in the same direction. Our …ndings are, if anything, strengthened, in that results by demographic groups show even starker di¤erences between households in the upper and lower education and income groups. Finally, we split our sample between periods in which 12-month in ‡ation was above 2%, and periods in which it was below 2% and did a separate analysis for each subsample. Results are little changed.
Probit estimates
A natural alternative to our empirical approach would be to use probit models. In fact, the simple framework developed in Subsection 4.2 suggests precisely an probit-type speci…cation. In that case, the signs of the partial e¤ects, as well as statistical signi…cance of the possible relationships between in ‡ation and unemployment on one side and interest rates on the other side would be dictated by the Taylor rule coe¢ cients on in ‡ation and unemployment -which in turn determine the marginal e¤ects in the probit. Thus, either all partial e¤ects of in ‡ation would come out in accordance with the principles underlying the Taylor rule, or they would all come out contradicting those principles. The same would be true of the partial e¤ects of unemployment.
One advantage of an approach based on probits is that it imposes a parametric structure that uses information from all the empirical distributions of interest-rate responses given responses about in ‡ation and unemployment to estimate the two coe¢ cients that control those partial e¤ects. In contrast, our nonparametric approach estimates each possible partial e¤ect using only data from the two conditional distributions that de…ne it, and this reduces the number of observations underlying the estimates. On the positive side, because our approach does not impose any structure on the data, it allows for partial e¤ects that contradict each other. For example, we may estimate partial e¤ects of in ‡ation that are consistent with the stabilization principles underlying the Taylor rule when it comes to interest-rate increases, but which otherwise do not conform with those principles. In other words, the approach allows for asymmetries in perceptions about monetary policy that a standard probit would rule out by construction. Of course we could have modeled households' perceptions about the conduct of monetary policy by allowing explicitly for these asymmetries in the systematic component of households' interest-rate forecasts. However, that ‡exibility would have increased the number of parameters to be estimated one-to-one with the degrees of freedom that we wished to allow for in the estimation of partial e¤ects. In the limit, if we wished to allow each partial e¤ect to take any possible value, we would essentially be back to our nonparametric approach. The table reports estimated coe¢ cients and standard errors from probits of interest rates on in ‡ation and unemployment. Coe¢ cients followed by *** are signi…cant at 1%, ** are signi…cant at 5%, and * are signi…cant at 10%. Test statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors with correction for up to 12 lags.
To show that our main conclusions are robust to using probit models, in what follows we present results using this estimation method. Tables 15 and 17 present results for the Michigan Survey based on all pooled observations and for some demographic groups, respectively. They show that the relationship between in ‡ation and interest rates implied by households'answers lines up well with our estimated partial e¤ects of in ‡ation. For unemployment, however, the estimated coe¢ cient is not signi…cant, which is consistent with the fact that we estimate con ‡icting partial e¤ects of unemployment when we pool all household answers (Tables 4 and 5 ). When we split the sample by income and education levels, we …nd results that are consistent with the estimated partial e¤ects reported in Table 6 . Note that the probit estimates can also speak to the asymmetry in the responses regarding interest rate increases and decreases, which we detect with our estimated partial e¤ects of unemployment.
